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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This appeal concerns the priority of liens to real property and a commercial marina. The

real property is Blocks A, D, and E of Post Falls Landing, a real estate development located in
Post Falls, Idaho along the Spokane River. Post Falls Landing was owned and partially
developed by The Point at Post Falls, LLC ("The Point"). The Point also constructed the Post
Falls Landing Marina, a marina that is part of Post Falls Landing.
In 2004, The Point granted Respondent Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S.
("WKDT'') a deed of trust to the Post Falls Landing property to secure a promissory note. In
2005, Appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company ("Liberty") financed the project and
was also granted a deed of trust to the same property. As a condition of Liberty's loan, WKDT
agreed to subordinate its lien on the property to Liberty's lien. Over the next few years, Liberty
loaned The Point additional money, secured by the original deed of trust. The Point later granted
WKDT a security interest in the marina.
The Point defaulted on Liberty's loan, and Liberty acquired the property at a trustee's
sale held under its original deed of trust. This appeal arises because the district court, without
passing on the validity of the foreclosure sale, ruled that WKDT, not Liberty, holds a first
priority deed of trust in Blocks A, D, and E. The district court ruled that Liberty lost its priority
to WKDT's lien when Liberty entered into an agreement with The Point-titled the Eighth
Modification Agreement (the "Eighth Agreement")--to restructure Liberty's loan and deed of
trust. The district court also ruled that the marina was personal property, not a fixture, and that
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WKDT also holds priority to the marina over Liberty.
Those rulings are contrary to Idaho law and must be reversed. The Eighth Agreement
itself cannot release Blocks A, D, and E under Idaho's recording statutes. Not only was no
actual release of the property made or recorded, simply restructuring a loan and its security does
not destroy the priority of the original lien. In addition, WK.OT cannot enforce or claim the
benefit of the Eighth Agreement, since it is not a third-party beneficiary to the agreement.
Further, the foreclosure was not wrongful because the sale was not void as to WKDT.
While WKDT argues that notice was infirm because the Eighth Agreement was never
mentioned, the controlling statute does not require notice of the Eighth Agreement. Therefore,
WKDT had no right to challenge the trustee's sale, and any rights it may have had were
extinguished by that sale. Nor can the agreement be deemed enforceable under the concept of
judicial estoppel under the record before the Court. Finally, the undisputed objective evidence
demonstrates that the marina should be treated as a fixture, not personal property.

In sum, the district court should have found that Liberty maintains priority to Blocks A,
D, and E of Post Falls Landing and the Post Falls Landing Marina under its original deed of trust
and that the trustee's sale of the property was proper under Idaho law. Liberty respectfully asks
that the Court reverse the district court's judgment and denial of Liberty's motion for
reconsideration.

B.

Course of Proceedings
On February 5, 2013, Liberty filed a complaint against WKDT, seeking a judicial

determination that the Post Falls Landing Marina improvements constituted a fixture of the real
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property and not personal property. R.VoLl at 11. 1 WKDT answered the complaint and then on
July 1, 2013 filed a counterclaim. R.Vol. 1 at 114; R.Vol.2 at 270. WKDT's counterclaim
sought a judicial determination that Liberty's deed of trust on Blocks A, D, and E of Post Falls
Landing was subordinated to WKDT's deed of trust. R.Vol.2 at 284-86. It also alleged claims
of breach of contract, conversion, and slander of title. Id. at 286-88.
On September 10, 2013, WKDT moved for partial summary judgment. R.Vol.3 at 523.
The district court mostly denied the motion but found that WKDT was "entitled to judgment as a
matter of law" that "Liberty is estopped from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Loan
Modification Agreement." R.Vol.5 at 1042, 1048. The district court heard the parties'
remaining issues during a two-day bench trial beginning on December 16, 2013.
On January 8, 2014, the district court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
R. Vol.6 at 1180. The district court held that WKDT holds a first priority deed of trust in Blocks
A, D, and E because the Eighth Agreement released Liberty's deed of trust on that property and
WKDT did not agree to subordinate its lien to Liberty's substituted deed of trust. Id. at 1193-96.
The district court also held that the Post Falls Landing Marina is personal property, not a fixture,
and that WKDT has a first priority lien to the marina. Id. at 1196-99.
On January 22, 2014, Liberty moved for reconsideration. Id. at 1204. The district court
1 The

Clerk's Record is cited as "R.Vol.1" for volume 1, "R.Vol.2" for volume 2, and so
on. The Reporter's Transcript is composed of two unlabeled volumes. The larger transcript (of
287 pages) includes the transcript from trial and is cited as "Tr. Vol. l ." The deposition transcript
of Harry Green, which was admitted at trial as Court Ex. 1, is cited as "Green Depo." Trial
exhibits are cited as "Ex." For the Court's convenience, Liberty also submits an appendix with
key documents relevant to this appeal.
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heard the motion and denied it on February 27, 2014. Id. at 1271. On March 12, 2014, the
district court entered a Final Judgment and Decree Quieting Title. Id. at 1315. Liberty filed this
appeal on March 21, 2014. Id. at 1340.
C.

Statement of Facts

1.

In 2001, The Point Purchased Property Along the Spokane River to Develop
Post Falls Landing, and Later It Granted WKDT and Liberty Promissory
Notes Secured by Deeds of Trust on the Property.

In 2001, The Point purchased 34 acres of property in Post Falls, Idaho along the Spokane
River to construct a mixed-use, waterfront development of condominiums, a hotel, restaurants,
retail and office space, and a riverfront boardwalk. R.Vol.5 at 1078 (15); Ex. 1 at 2, 5. The
development became known as Post Falls Landing. From the outset, Post Falls Landing was
designed to take advantage of the waterfront. See Exs. 1, 3; Green Depo. at 14:18-15:16;
Tr.Vol.I at 91 :5-13. For that reason, The Point also planned a commercial marina consisting of
142 boat slips and a floating convenience store as part of Post Falls Landing, providing the
development access to the Spokane River. Green Depo. at 14:18-15:16; Exs. 3, 12. The marina
became known as the Post Falls Landing Marina.
WKDT is a law firm that represented The J>oint, along with The Point's manager, Harry
Green, and other Green-related entities. Tr.Vol.1 at 182:11-183:10. In September 2004, The
Point and Green provided WKDT with a promissory note in the amount of$164,171.85 to
account for unpaid fees and costs. Ex. A. The note was secured by a deed of trust on the Post
Falls Landing property. Ex. B. On October 4, 2004, WKDT recorded the deed of trust as
Instrument No. 1904658 in the records of Kootenai County. Id. As discussed below, the
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following year, WKDT agreed to subordinate its interest in the Post Falls Landing property as a
condition of Liberty making a loan to The Point to refinance Post Falls Landing. Exs. C, H.
Liberty and its subsidiaries are licensed to underwrite insurance policies in 46 states and
the District of Columbia. Tr.Vol.lat 86:20-22; R.Vol.4 at 853. To diversify its portfolio,
Liberty invests a portion of its assets in real property and commercial mortgages. Tr.Vol.1 at
86:24-87:20. On August 26, 2005, Liberty loaned The Point $3,934,390 to refinance its
acquisition of Post Falls Landing. Ex. 18. To evidence the loan, The Point executed a
promissory note, and to secure the loan, it delivered a deed of trust. Exs. 18, 19. The deed of
trust conveyed a security interest in the nine parcels comprising Post Falls Landing and all
improvements and fixtures developed on the property. Ex. 19 at 1. Liberty recorded its deed of
trust in the records of Kootenai County as Instrument No. 1975501. Ex. 19.
As a condition of Liberty's loan agreement, WKDT agreed to subordinate its lien on the
property "to [The Point's] new loan from [Liberty] in an amount not to exceed a combined
principal amount of approximately $9,500,000.00." Ex.Hat 1; see also Tr.Vol.1 at 93:18-25.
On August 23, 2005, WKDT and The Point entered into a Subordination Agreement, which
recognizes "[t]hat [Liberty] would not make its loan above described without this subordination
agreement." Ex. H at 2. WKDT agreed:
That said deed of trust securing said note in favor of [Liberty], and any renewals
or extensions thereof, shall unconditionally be and remain at all time a lien or
charge on the property therein described, prior and superior to the lien or charge
of the deed of trust [of WKDT].

Id. WKDT also acknowledged that "specific loans and advances are being and will be made and,
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as part and parcel thereof, specific monetary and other obligations are being and will be entered
into which would not be made or entered into but for said reliance upon this waiver,
relinquishment and subordination." Id. The Subordination Agreement was recorded with
Kootenai County on August 29, 2005 as Instrument No. 1975674. Id. at 1.

2.

Liberty's Note Was Modified to Extend The Point Additional Money to
Develop Post Falls Landing and the Post Falls Landing Marina.

Since that time, Liberty and The Point modified their loan to include funding for the
construction of Post Falls Landing. In August 2006, Liberty loaned The Point $2,200,000 to
allow it "to construct a full service marina facility on the Spokane River in Post Falls, Idaho."
Ex. 20 at 1. In December 2006, the loan was increased by $205,087 to cover cost overruns on
the marina. Ex. 21 at 2. In 2007, a series of additional loan modifications re-disbursed portions
of the loan already repaid by The Point and extended the loan's maturity date. See Exs. X at 2-3,
Y at 2-3, Z at 2. Liberty advanced The Point additional moneys in October 2008, December
2008, and October 2009. See Exs. AA, BB, CC. Each loan modification was secured by
Liberty's original deed of trust. See, e.g., Exs. 20 at 6 (,J 8), CC at 5 (,J 25).
On April 30, 2010, Liberty and The Point entered into the Seventh Loan Modification
Agreement (the "Seventh Agreement"). Ex. 22. At that time, the outstanding principal balance
of the note was $6,786,108.10. Id. at 2 (,J 1). Liberty advanced The Point an additional
$2,505,891.90. Id. at 2 (,J 3). The agreement also extended the maturity date of Liberty's
promissory note to June 30, 2011. Id. at 2 (,J 2). As before, Liberty's original deed of trust
continued to encumber the property as security for the loan. See id. at 7 (,J 27).

-676940671.10 005434)-00001

3.

Using the Money Loaned by Liberty, The Point Developed Two
Condominium Buildings and the Post Falls Landing Marina.

As noted, The Point designed Post Falls Landing as a waterfront development with access
to the Spokane River through a commercial marina. Harry Green described the concept of the
marina as "gold" and said "access to the water would be a plus for the development." Green
Depo. at 14:18-20, 15:13-16. As early as 2001, Green approached HDB Marine, a marine
construction company, about developing a marina for Post Falls Landing. Tr.Vol.I at 223:12225:5. An April 2002 "vision plan" for Post Falls Landing shows the marina and riverfront
boardwalk. Ex. 1 at 2, 5; see also Green Depo. at 12:19-13:20, 14:18-20. The development's
April 2003 "master plan" shows phase 1 to include a "[m]arina with 38 boat slips," along with
"Boardwalk Residential Buildings 20 & 21." Ex. 3 at 3. The master plan includes two
conceptual renderings of the marina, one with five access ramps from the shore and another with
two access ramps. Id at 2, 3; Green Depo. at 17:23-18:5.
In December 2003, to develop the marina, The Point obtained an encroachment permit
from the Idaho Department of Lands ("IDOL"). Ex. 7. The encroachment permit granted The
Point permission to install and maintain a marina consisting of a dock and pier system of 142
boat slips, a floating convenience store and fuel pumps, a 140-foot boom system for marina
entry, and a launching pier for dry stack boat storage. Id. at 1. On May 20, 2005, IDOL also
issued The Point a commercial submerged lands lease (for a 10-year term) to operate the marina.
Ex. 10. IDOL reissued the encroachment permit on June 29, 2007 and July 15, 2008. Exs. 8, 9.
Between 2005 and 2007, using loan proceeds provided by Liberty, The Point completed
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construction of the two condominium buildings-Pier 20 on the Boardwalk and Pier 21 on the
Boardwalk-and a boardwalk along the Spokane River. See Ex. 11 at 1; Green Depo. at 19:420: 15; Tr.Vol.I at 94:1-95:21, 110:8-24. In 2007, again using money loaned by Uberty, HOB
Marine completed the Post Falls Landing Marina at a cost of approximately $1,778,000.
Tr.Vol.1 at 96:9-12, 228: 11-229:13. As built, the marina consists of 142 boat slips formed by a
system of floating galvanized steel truss docks and fixed pier docks, a floating convenience store
and fuel pumps, a boat loading platform, and underground fuel tanks on the upland real property.
Exs. 11, 12; Tr.Vol. I at 226:19-227:2, 228:20-24, 236:25-237:4, 237:16-239:1.
The marina is connected to the Post Falls Landing property through a concrete ramp and
a gangway, fixed pier docks secured by pilings to the shore, a boat landing platform also secured
by pilings to the shore, and submerged fuel, water, and electrical lines. Ex. 11 at 1; Green Depo.
at 30:3-31: 17; Tr.Vol.l at 237: 16-25. The floating docks are held in place by steel pilings sunk
into the riverbed. Tr.Vol.1 at 228:2-10, 240:9-11. The fuel lines service the fuel pumps from the
underground fuel tanks. Green Depo. at 31:13-17; Tr.Vol.1 at 228:20-24. The water and
electrical lines service the boat slips from dedicated lines running from the adjacent real
property. Green Depo. at 31:3-12.
According to Harry Green, the marina was designed specifically for the Post Falls
Landing site but "with the potential of being able to take it apart." Id. at 42:3-7 ("It could all be
taken apart, but it was built to be in that spot."). He testified that it was designed to "unplug"
and "pull apart," that "it could have been anywhere" and was "not necessarily" intended to be a
permanent amenity of Post Falls Landing in case IDOL did not issue a permit. Id. at 42: 10-22,
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30:22-31 :2. Mark Wagner of HDB Marine testified that floating docks, by their nature, are
movable and can be floated away, but that removing the fixed pier docks, boat landing platform,
pilings driven into the riverbed, and underground fuel tanks would require additional efforts.
Tr.Vol.I at 232: 18-233:5, 237: 13-238: 11.
In any regard, by 2008, The Point began operating the Post Falls Landing Marina and
generated revenue from boat moorage, the convenience store, and fuel sales. Exs. 13-16. By
2012, the marina was no longer in operation. Green Depo. at 39:18-21. At the time of trial, the
facilities and improvements of the Post Falls Landing Marina remained in place, adjoined to the
Post Falls Landing property. See Tr.Vol.I at 102:1-10. On February 22, 2013, IDOL issued a
commercial submerged lands lease for the marina to Liberty. Ex. 38.
At trial, Rodney Braun, a specialized appraisal manager for the Kootenai County
Assessor's Office, testified that Kootenai County appraises commercial marinas as real property,
as opposed to personal property, and assesses the value to the upland property owner. Tr.Vol.1
at 79:25-80: 19, 81: 17-22, 83: 17-22. He also testified that Kootenai County assesses the Post
Falls Landing Marina in that way. Id. at 81 :2-11. According to Braun, as compared with the
policies of other assessors in the State of Idaho, there is nothing unique about how Kootenai
County assesses commercial marinas. Id. at 84:23-85:4.

4.

The Debt Owed Under WKDT's Promissory Note Was Increased, and
WKDT Entered into Additional Subordination Agreements.

As Post Falls Landing was being developed, WKDT's promissory note was modified to
include additional unpaid fees and security for the note. In December 2006, the note increased to
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$283,614, Ex. J at 1, and in July 2009, to $610,663.03 plus $88,615.97 in interest. See Ex.Nat
1-2. Under the last modification, on August 6, 2010, The Point agreed to pay WKDT
$751,557.35 plus $168,814.19 in interest, and WKDT agreed to extend the maturity of the note
to June 30, 2011. Ex. R. In addition to the deed of trust, the modified note is secured by a
security interest in personal property identified as the marina's encroachment permit,
improvements, and related equipment. Ex. R at 2; Ex. S. On September 7, 201 0, WKDT
recorded the modified note and deed of trust as Instrument No. 2280549000, Ex. R, and filed a
UCC Financing Statement covering the marina collateral, Ex. S.
WKDT also executed and recorded additional subordination agreements, subordinating
its lien priority in the Post Falls Landing property to Liberty's deed of trust in February 2007,
May 2007, December 2008, and November 2009. See Exs. K, L, M, 0. WKDT executed its last
Subordination Agreement on August 10, 2010, after Liberty and The Point entered into the
Seventh Agreement. Ex. Q. Under the Subordination Agreement, WKDT agreed:
That said deed of trust securing said note in favor of [Liberty] shall
unconditionally be and remain at all time a lien or charge on the property therein
described, prior and superior to the lien or charge of the deed of trust [of WKDT].

Id. at 2. WKDT also acknowledged that "specific loans and advances are being and will be
made and, as part and parcel thereof, specific monetary and other obligations are being and will
be entered into which would not be made or entered into but for said reliance upon this waiver,
relinquishment and subordination." Id. at 2-3. On September 3, 2010, the Subordination
Agreement was recorded as Instrument No. 228035400. Id. at 1.
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5.

After The Point Defaulted on Liberty's Promissory Note, Liberty and The
Point Entered into the Eighth Agreement to Restructure the Note and Deed
of Trust.

Following the Seventh Agreement, in February 2011, Liberty asked The Point to enter
into an eighth modification agreement for the sole purpose of restructuring the promissory note
asaconstructionloanandlandacquisitionloan. Tr.Vol.1 at 128:17-16, 132:14-19. Asan
insurance company, Liberty is subject to regulatory oversight in each jurisdiction in which it
conducts business. See Tr.Vol. I at 86:24-87:20. In September 2007, Liberty and the State of
Florida entered into a consent order regarding the company's compliance with Florida's
minimum capital and surplus requirements. Ex. PP at 3. As a result of the agreement, Liberty
agreed that it would limit new construction loans to ".25% of admitted assets secured in any one
construction loan and 2% of admitted assets in the aggregate." Id. at 5 (,J 4(±)). Liberty's loan to
The Point was not mentioned in Liberty's agreement with Florida regulators. See generally id.
In February 2011, Liberty was already operating within those limits, as construction loans
it had issued amounted to only 1.08% of its admitted assets. Tr.Vol.I at 124:10-18. In addition,
the State of Florida never demanded that Liberty formally segregate The Point's loan. Id. at
153:1-5. Nevertheless, Liberty decided to segregate the construction loan proceeds from The
Point's loan into a new promissory note, secured by a separate deed of trust. Tr.Vol.1 at 120:324, 128:17-129: 10. As Bradford Phillips, the president of Liberty, explained, Liberty wished to
correctly characterize the money it had loaned The Point, after the initial refinancing loan, as a
construction loan to prevent Florida regulators from considering all the money loaned as a
construction loan. Id. While Liberty's request for an eighth modification agreement was
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outstanding, the loan, by its terms, matured on June 30, 2011. Id. at 133:24-134:8. When The
Point failed to make the payment at maturity, it defaulted on Liberty's note, and the trustee on
Liberty's deed of trust recorded a notice of default. See id.; Ex. FF.
Despite the loan maturity and ensuing default, Liberty and The Point executed the Eighth
Agreement in September 2011. Ex. J J at 7, 12. Under the Eighth Agreement, The Point agreed
to restructure Liberty's promissory note by executing construction loan documents evidencing a
note in the sum of $2,545,843.31, secured by a deed of trust on parcels that were to be designated
as Blocks A, D, and E of Post Falls Landing. Id. at ,i 24; see also Tr.Vol. I at 147:18-148:3; Ex.
UU. The amount of The Point's debt and the interest rate remained the same as in the existing
note. Ex. JJ at ,i 3; Tr.Vol. I at 146:20-147:2. Further, the Eighth Agreement did not extend the
maturity date and did not waive The Point's existing default. Ex. JJ at ,iii 1-3; Tr.Vol.I at 147:35; see also Ex. 40 at 1.
Liberty agreed to execute the Eighth Agreement in return for the execution and delivery
of a replacement deed of trust. Ex. JJ at ,i 24. Liberty agreed to execute a partial release of
Blocks A, D, and E from the existing deed of trust. Id. However, not only would the existing
deed of trust remain in effect, but the construction loan and land acquisition loan would be crossdefaulted and cross-collateralized by each deed of trust. Id. at iii! 13, 15, 18, 25.

6.

The Eighth Agreement Was Never Performed.

The Eighth Agreement, however, was never performed. At trial, Bradford Phillips
testified that The Point never signed or returned the necessary loan documents, including the new
promissory note for the construction loan and the substituted deed of trust for Blocks A, D, and
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E. Tr.Vol.1 at 149:6-152:11. According to the district court, relying on Harry Green's
deposition testimony, Green testified ''that he specifically remembered returning the original
documents to Liberty." R.Vol.6 at 1273. But in any event, the substitute deed of trust on Blocks
A, D, and E was never recorded, and Liberty never released its lien on Blocks A, D, and E.
Tr.Vol.1 at 152:12-15.

7.

After Defaulting on Liberty's Promissory Note, The Point Filed for
Bankruptcy, and Liberty Filed an Action Against The Point's Guarantors.

After The Point defaulted on June 30, 2011, the trustee recorded a notice of default under
the deed of trust and scheduled a trustee's sale for December 19, 2011. Ex. FF. The day of the
trustee's sale, The Point filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in In re The Point at Post Falls,
L.L.C., Case No. 11-21607-TLM (Bankr. D. Idaho.) ("In re The Point"). A day later, Liberty

filed a complaint against Harry Green and the other guarantors of Liberty's original promissory
note. R.Vol.6 at 1157; R.Vol.5 at 1137-38

(i!i! 23-24).

That action was captioned as Liberty

Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Harry A. Green et al., Case No. CV-2011-10121 (Idaho Dist. Ct.,
Kootenai Cnty) ("Liberty v. Green").
In In re The Point, on April 18, 2012, Liberty filed a proof of claim and attached an
executed copy of the Eighth Agreement. Ex. VV at 1, 4. The following day, WKDT also filed a
proof of claim. Ex. WW at 1. In its proof of claim, WKDT claimed entitlement to a "1st lien on
encroachment permit and marina facilities; 2nd lien on real property and personal property." Id.
In July 2012, Liberty filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on the Post
Falls Landing property under its original deed of trust. Ex. XX. In support of the motion,
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Liberty submitted its original promissory note (Ex. 18), its original deed of trust (Ex. 19), and the
executed Eighth Agreement (Ex. JJ). Ex. XX at 1-2.
At trial, WKDT asserted, and the district court found, that it did not learn The Point
executed the Eighth Agreement until 2013. Tr.Vol.I at 202:16-20; R.Vol.6 at 1189 (,I 3).
However, Denny Davis, a WKDT attorney, also acknowledged that WKDT was a claimant in In

re The Point, received electronic notice of the filings in that matter, and was served with
Liberty's motion for relief from the automatic stay. Tr.Vol.I at 210:24-214:4. Indeed, shortly
after Liberty filed and served its motion for relief from the automatic stay, WKDT filed an
objection to the motion, asserting its priority to "the marina facilities and permit." Ex. YY at 12. It did not challenge Liberty's first priority on the Post Falls Landing property under Liberty's
original deed of trust. See id. The bankruptcy court never ruled on Liberty's motion and on
September 6, 2012, dismissed the proceeding. See R.Vol.3 at 638.
Once In re The Point was dismissed, the trustee on Liberty's deed of trust rescheduled the
trustee's sale for October 8, 2012. Ex. GO. The Point then moved to intervene in Liberty v.

Green and also sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the trustee's sale. R.VoL6 at 1157;
R.Vol.3 at 1139 (,I 32); see also R.Vol.3 at 636,638. Liberty's complaint in that action alleged a
breach of the original promissory note by the note's guarantors. R.Vol.5 at 955-56 (Ex. 1). As
part of that claim, Liberty alleged that the maturity date of the note had been extended to June
30, 2011 under the Seventh Agreement and attached a copy of the agreement. Id. at 953-57.
In that litigation, The Point sought to enjoin the October 8, 2012 trustee's sale on the
basis that the sale should be conducted under the Eighth Agreement. See R. Vol.3 at 640-41.
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The district court in that matter held The Point did not meet its burden to show a substantial
likelihood of success on Liberty's breach of contract claim but that "there may be a substantial
likelihood of success that the Eighth Loan Modification Agreement is what applies. And if the
Eighth Loan Modification Agreement applies, it will affect how foreclosure is performed." Id. at
648-49. Finding foreclosure inevitable in any regard, the district court ordered The Point to post
a bond of $875,000 prior to the sale to avoid it. Id. at 658. No bond was ever posted.

8.

Liberty Purchased Post Falls Landing at a Trustee's Sale Held November 14,
2012 and Filed a Trustee's Deed on the Property the Same Day.

The trustee's sale of the Post Falls Landing property was rescheduled and re-noticed for
November 14, 2012. 2 Ex. 36 at 16-17. WKDT raised no objection to the November 14, 2012
foreclosure. In fact, in a letter to Liberty dated October 17, 2012, WKDT acknowledged the
November 14, 2012 trustee's sale and admitted that "if completed, the effect of the Foreclosure
Sale will be the elimination of our second priority lien against the [real] Property." Ex. 37.
Liberty proceeded with the trustee's sale on November 14, 2012, and purchased the property for
a credit bid of $3,404,000. Ex. 36. The trustee's deed was recorded as Instrument No.
238410100 in Kootenai County the same day. Id.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the Eighth Agreement release Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's original

deed of trust under Idaho's recording and priority statutes?

On October 8, 2012, The Point again petitioned for bankruptcy. R.Vol.6 at 1157;
R.Vol.5 at 1139 (i\ 37). The petition was dismissed on October 18, 2012. R.Vol.6 at 1157;
R.Vol.5 at 1140 (ii 39).
2
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2.

Can WKDT enforce the Eighth Agreement as a third-party beneficiary?

3.

Was the foreclosure wrongful?

4.

Does the doctrine of judicial estoppel estop Liberty "from denying the

enforceability of the Eighth Agreement"?
5.

Are the facilities and improvements comprising the Post Falls Landing Marina

fixtures or personal property?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court must defer to the district court's
findings of fact to the extent they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Estate of

Skvorakv. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 19, 89 P.3d 856,859 (2004); Idaho R. Civ. P.
52(a). When the district court tries the action without ajury, determinations on the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, the testimony's probative effect, and inferences
and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all matters within the province of the trial court.

Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho at 19, 89 P.3d at 859. The Court, however, exercises free review
over conclusions of law. Id.
Summary Judgment. To affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Court
must be convinced that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that the moving
party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). The burden of proof
is on WKDT. See Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,222,220 P.3d 575,578 (2009). When an
action will be tried without a jury, the district court "may ... draw probable inferences arising
from the undisputed evidentiary facts," but summary judgment is improper "ifreasonable
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persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented." Id.
The Court must still liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of Liberty. See id.
("Conflicting evidentiary facts, however, must still be viewed in favor of the nonrnoving
party."). To determine whether WKDT is entitled to summary judgment, the Court exercises
free review over the enti.re record before the district court and reviews the inferences drawn by
the district court to determine whether the record reasonably supports them. See id. As before,
when questions oflaw are presented, the Court exercises free review. Lettunich v. Key Bank
Nat 'l Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 366, 109 P.3d 1104, 1108 (2005).
Motion to Reconsider. The denial of a motion to reconsider brought pursuant to Idaho R.
Civ. P. l l(a)(2)(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Rocky Mountain Power v. Jensen,
154 Idaho 549,557, 300 P.3d 1037, 1045 (2012). The test for determining whether the trial
court abused its discretion involves three inquiries: (1) whether the court recognized the issue as
discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Under Idaho's Recording Statutes, th~ Eighth Agreement Does Not Release Blocks
A, D, and E from Liberty's Deed of Trust, and WKDT Remains a Junior Lienholder
Whose Rights Were Extinguished by the Trustee's Sale.
To reach the conclusion that "WKDT's senior lien holds first priority as to parcels[] A,

D, and E," the district court found that "[t]he Eighth Loan Modification Agreement released
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parcels A, D, and E from [Liberty's] original deed of trust and secured those parcels under a
separate deed of trust." R.Vol.6 at 1193. From there, the district court found that "WKDT
agreed to subordinate its lien to Liberty's original deed of trust," but "did not agree to
subordinate its lien to Liberty's deed of trust discussed in ,i 24 of the Eighth Loan Modification
Agreement and pertaining to parcels A, D, and E." Id. at 1194. The district court's findings
cannot be sustained under Idaho's recording and priority statutes.
1.

Because Liberty Never Released Blocks A, D, and E from Its Original Deed
of Trust, It Maintains Priority to the Property.

Regardless of whether the Eighth Agreement was performed, the fact remains that Blocks
A, D, and E were never released from Liberty's original deed of trust. The original deed of trust
remained in the records of Kootenai County, as did WKDT's many subordination agreements.
WKDT's senior priority arises solely and exclusively from the district court's judgment in this
matter. Because properly recorded instruments control priority under Idaho recording statutes,
the district court erred when it found the Eighth Agreement released Blocks A, D, and E from
Liberty's original deed of trust.
The Court exercises free review when interpreting the meaning of a statute and applying
the facts to the law. Stonebrook Constr., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 152 Idaho 927,931,
277 P.3d 374, 378 (2012). Statutory interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute.

Id. Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, the Court will not engage in
statutory construction but will give effect to the statute as written. Id. The statute should be
considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Verska v.
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Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011).
Under Idaho recording law, the priority of conflicting liens on real estate is determined at
the time ofrecording. Idaho Code§ 55-811 provides that "[e]very conveyance ofreal property
... recorded as prescribed by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is
constructive notice of the contents thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgag(e)es."
Additionally, Idaho Code§ 55-812 states that "[e]very conveyance ofreal property ... is void as
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good
faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded." See also Idaho
Code§ 55-606 (stating every mortgage is conclusive against everyone subsequently claiming
under grantor, except a good faith encumbrancer who gives value and records first).
It follows that "[c]onstructive notice imparted from the record ... is a matter of statute."

Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195, 30 P.3d 970,973 (2001). As explained in Kalange,
Idaho recording statutes are designed for the "ultimate purpose of permitting purchasers to rely
upon the record title." Id. at 196, 30 P.3d at 974. An instrument that is properly recorded is
notice to all persons of the existence of the instrument: "a mortgage recorded first in time has
priority against all other subsequent mortgagees." Estate ofSkvorak, 140 Idaho at 23, 89 P.3d at
863; see also Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862,867, 853 P.2d 607,612
(Ct. App. 1993) ("A mortgagee of real property is charged with notice of, and takes in
subordination to, any prior properly recorded and unreleased mortgage.").
Idaho case law has uniformly followed that principle, even where a subsequent
agreement contemplates a release of a lien but the agreement is not performed. See Int'[ Mortg.
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Bank v. Whitaker, 44 Idaho 178, 185, 255 P. 903, 905 (1927). In International Mortgage Bank,
Whitaker granted a mortgage covering 160 acres ofland to a bank to secure a note of$15,000.
Id. at 181,255 P. at 904. After the bank recorded the mortgage, Whitaker sold 80 acres of the
property to Frank, who agreed to assume and pay part of the note. Id A materialsman later
furnished materials to Frank to build a house and barn on his property. Id.
Whitaker, Frank, and the bank then agreed to formally separate the obligation and
mortgage lien among Whitaker's and Frank's respective parcels-a $7,500 mortgage to
Whitaker and a $6,500 mortgage to Frank. Id at 182,255 P. at 904. Whitaker and Frank
executed their mortgages, and the bank recorded the same. Id. Under the parties' agreements,
however, the split of the $15,000 mortgage was to take effect only upon certain conditions,
which were not fulfilled. Id. at 185,255 P. at 905. Whitaker and Frank later defaulted, and the
bank filed to foreclose on its $15,000 mortgage. Id. at 182,255 P. at 904. The materialsman
claimed the restructuring relinquished the original mortgage, giving his lien priority. Id. at 184,
255 P. at 905.
The trial court rejected the materialsman's argument, and the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed. Id. at 185, 255 P. at 905. The Court found the bank's lien of the $15,000 mortgage
was of record when the materialsman first furnished the materials and was prior to the
materialsman's lien: "[ w]here not so discharged and the debt is not extinguished, the lien upon
the land remains." Id. at 184-85, 255 P. at 905. The Court also reasoned that the "mere fact that
there was a conditional understanding that the mortgage might be split upon certain conditions,
which were not fulfilled, did not operate as a discharge of the $15,000 debt or the lien of the
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mortgage securing the same, it not appearing that such was the intention of the parties." Id. at
185,255 P. at 905.
Also instructive is the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kemp, 95 l F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992). In Resolution Trust, a developer
obtained a loan from a lender to finance the development of a residential subdivision. Id. at 659.
The developer later obtained additional financing from a second lender. Id. Both lenders
received deeds of trust on the property and recorded the deeds. Id. Pursuant to several
subordination agreements, the original lender subordinated its lien to the lien of the second
lender and agreed to release its lien on individual lots as the lots were sold. Id. The
subordination agreements were also recorded. Id. The developer later defaulted on its
obligations under the original lender's note. Id. at 660.
Purchasers of the subdivision lots sued to enjoin the original lender from foreclosing on
the property to satisfy the developer's debt. 3 Id. They claimed that because their lots were sold,
they were entitled to the partial releases the original lender agreed to in subordination
agreements. Id. The litigation was later realigned, with the original lender pursuing judicial
foreclosure against the lot purchasers (and their lenders); the lot purchasers counterclaimed for
the value of improvements made to the property. Id. On summary judgment, the trial court
ordered the original lender's lien to be foreclosed and ruled the lot purchasers were to receive
nothing from their improvements. Id.
3 Although the assets of the original lender were transferred to another lending entity, for
simplicity's sake, we continue to refer to the replacement lender as the original lender.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit held that the
original lender's liens were not "automatically released" under the subordination agreements
when the lots were sold. Id. at 661. The court also held that the liens were not rendered
"unenforceable" when the original lender failed to execute the releases required by the
subordination agreements. Id. Citing Texas recording statutes, the court found that the deed
records showed the original lender's liens were recorded first, before the lot purchasers took their
interests in the property, and thus were superior. Id. at 662. Although the subordination
agreements contemplated the release of liens under certain conditions, no release was ever
recorded, and the public records did not reflect any release. Id. at 661-62.
The same is true here. Through its many subordination agreements, WKDT agreed to
reduce the priority of its deed of trust relative to Liberty's original deed of trust. See Blickenstqff
v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,581, 97 P.3d 439,448 (2004) ("[A] 'complete' subordination permits
no payment to be made on the subordinated debt at any time while the senior debt remains
outstanding." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; brackets in original)). Indeed, in
the Subordination Agreement dated August 10, 2010, WKDT agreed: "That said deed of trust
securing said note in favor of [Liberty] shall unconditionally be and remain at all time a lien or
charge on the property therein described, prior and superior to the lien or charge of the deed of
trust [of WKDT]." Ex. Q at 2. As with any contract, the meaning of the Subordination
Agreement must be determined from the plain meaning of its own words. Elliott v. Darwin
Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003) (determination of unambiguous

contract's meaning and legal effect is question of law).

- 227694067 l. 10 0054341-00001

It is undisputed that Liberty never released Blocks A, D, and E from its original deed of
trust. No document incorporating a release exists between Liberty and The Point, and no release
was ever recorded in the records of Kootenai County. Nor was Liberty's original deed of trust
ever reconveyed, as The Point never performed the obligation secured by the deed of trust. See
Idaho Code§ 45-1514 ("Upon performance of the obligation secured by the deed of trust, the
trustee ... shall reconvey the estate of real property described in the deed of trust to the
grantor[.]"); Idaho Code§ 45-1202 (providing trust deed may be reconveyed "if the obligation
secured by the trust deed shall have been fully paid").
As a result, the public records reflected that Liberty maintained its original deed of trust
on the entire Post Falls Landing property. See Idaho Code§§ 55-811, 55-812. As recognized in
Kalange, "[o]ne claiming title to lands is chargeable with notice of every matter affecting the

estate, which appears on the face of any recorded deed forming an essential link in his chain of
title, and also with notice of such matters as might be learned by inquiry which the recitals in
such instruments made it a duty to pursue." 136 Idaho at 196, 30 P.3d at 974. Liberty thus.
maintained senior priority to Blocks A, D, and E over WKDT's interest and was entitled to
foreclose the property at the November 14, 2012 trustee's sale.
In concluding otherwise, the district court ignored the order of recording and the legal
effect of WKDT's Subordination Agreement and legally erred by affording priority to WKDT
through the judgment. The Court should reverse the district court's judgment and denial of
Liberty's motion for reconsideration on this basis alone.
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2.

Even if the Eighth Agreement Was Performed, Restructuring The Point's
Notes and Taking a New Deed of Trust Would Not Operate to Release
Liberty's Original Deed of Trust.

Even if the Eighth Agreement was fully performed and The Point granted a new deed of
trust on Blocks A, D, and E to Liberty, the agreement does not create new debt or new security
for the loan. See Ex. JJ. Rather, the Eighth Agreement is merely an agreement between Liberty
and The Point to restructure the existing loan into a land acquisition loan and construction loan
using the same security. See id. Under Idaho law, substituting a loan and a new mortgage does
not impair or destroy the lien of the original mortgage, unless that was the parties' intent. W
Loan&Sav. Co. v. KendrickStateBank, 13 Idaho331,335,90P. 112,113 (1907). As such,
contrary to the district court's ruling, the Eighth Agreement does not release Liberty's original
deed of trust.
Western Loan & Savings demonstrates the district court's error. There the Taylors
granted a bank a mortgage on a lot of land to secure a $450 loan. Id at 333, 90 P. at 112. The
bank recorded the mortgage. Id. The Taylors conveyed the lot to the Normolyes, but the $450
mortgage remained. Id. Two years later, the Normolyes granted a mortgage on the same lot to a
second bank to secure a $3,900 loan. Id. at 334, 90 P. at 112. That mortgage was also recorded.
Id. Later, the first bank brought an action to foreclose the $450 mortgage, and the action was
settled by the Normolyes giving the first bank a new mortgage on the lot to secure a new loan of
$410, the balance left on the $450 loan. Id. at 334, 90 P. at 113. The $410 mortgage was also
recorded. Id.
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After the first bank brought an action to foreclose the $410 mortgage, the question arose
between the first bank and second bank of which mortgage was the prior and superior lien on the
lot. Id. at 333, 90 P. at 112. The Court held the first bank's original mortgage-the $450
mortgage-was a valid and subsisting mortgage on the lot and a prior lien to the second bank's
$3,900 mortgage. Id. at 334, 90 P. at 113. The Court reasoned that the $450 mortgage was
never paid, the $410 mortgage was a renewal and continuation of a portion of the original debt,
and the intent of the first bank and the Normolyes was a renewal, not payment. Id.
The Court has continued to follow the rule that the parties to a note secured by a
mortgage may substitute a new note and mortgage without impairing the s~curity, so long as the
original secured debt remains unpaid and the parties have not agreed otherwise. 4 In Walker v.
Farmers' Bank of Kendrick, 41 Idaho 279, 238 P. 968 (1925), a case with facts similar to those
of Western Loan & Savings, the Court held that the taking of a second mortgage to secure the
renewal of a note, secured by a first mortgage on the same property, does not operate to release

4 Idaho law is in accord with other states. See, e.g., Rebel v. Nat'l City Bank of
Evansville, 598 N .E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("[T]he taking of a new note and
mortgage for the same debt upon the same land will not discharge the lien of the first mortgage
unless the parties so intended."); Am. Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 122 P. 26, 27 (Wash.
1912) ("The manifest intention of all parties interested and participating was not to discharge the
lien of the mortgage, but to continue it. The purpose was not to create a new incumbrance, but
merely to change the form of the old. A court of equity will look straight to the substance of the
transaction rather than give heed to the mere form which it may assume."); see also Restatement
(Third) of Property: Mortgages§ 7.3(a) (1997) (senior mortgagee that discharges its mortgage of
record and records replacement mortgage does not lose its priority as against holder of
intervening interest unless that holder suffers material prejudice); 55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages§
345 (2014) ("The taking of a new note and mortgage for the same debt upon the same land will
not discharge the lien of the first mortgage unless the parties so intended .... "). ·
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the first mortgage. In International Mortgage Bank, the Court recognized that a new note and
mortgage do not "discharge an earlier debt or operate to satisfy an earlier mortgage upon
identical property." 44 Idaho at 185,255 P. at 905 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In effect, unless the parties evidence some other intent, "the lien of a mortgage secures
indebtedness rather than the evidence of indebtedness, and no change in the form of the
evidence, or in the mode or time of payment, in itself operates to discharge the mortgage." Smith

v. Thomas, 42 Idaho 375,380,245 P. 399,401 (1926).
The result here should be no different. Liberty and The Point intended to restructure,
reform, and continue the existing note as a land acquisition loan and a construction loan, secured
by the same property securing the existing note. Ex. JJ; see also Tr.Vol. I at 147:6-9, 148:4-9.
As the Eighth Agreement plainly reads:
13. Except as expressly modified and extended hereby, all terms and
provisions of the Loan Documents 151 are and shall remain unchanged, and the
Loan Documents are hereby ratified and confirmed and shall be and shall remain
in full force and effect. ...
15. Obligors hereby acknowledge and agree that the liens and security
interests of the Loan Documents, all as modified and extended hereby, are valid
and subsisting liens and security interests, subject only to the exceptions set forth
therein. Nothing contained herein shall affect or impair the validity or priority of
the liens and security interests under any or all of the Loan Documents ....
18. The parties hereby shall execute such other documents to be filed for
record as reasonably may be necessary or may be required to effect the
transactions contemplated hereby and to protect the lien and security interest of
the Loan Documents ....

5 The

"Loan Documents" referenced include Liberty's original note and deed of trust.

Ex. JJ at 1.
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25. The Loan Documents are hereby cross-defaulted and crosscollateralized with the loan documents evidencing and securing the $2,545,843.31
Promissory Note described in Section24 of this Agreement.
Ex. JJ at 4-6. Under the agreement, no portion of The Point's loan was to be paid off, and a new
loan was not made nor new security given. See id. Nor did the parties intend to discharge or
reconvey any portion of Liberty's original deed of trust. See id.
Thus, even if the Eighth Agreement was performed and Liberty was granted a new deed
of trust on Blocks A, D, and E, the release of the parcels would not affect the priority of
Liberty's lien under WKDT's Subordination Agreement or invalidate the November 14, 2012
trustee's sale. The district court's finding that WKDT is entitled to priority of Blocks A, D, and
E is also erroneous for this reason and should be overturned.

3.

Idaho Code§ 45-108 Does Not Operate to Release Blocks A, D, and E from
Liberty's Original Deed of Trust.

The district court relied on Idaho Code § 45-108 as a basis to find WKDT' s lien on
Blocks A, D, and E was valid and superior to the lien Liberty acquired under the Eighth
Agreement. This also amounts to legal error. Section 45- I 08 applies to the priority of a lien for
future advances and provides that "[a] lien may be created by contract, to take immediate effect,
as security for the performance of obligations not then in existence, which lien, if not invalid on
other grounds, shall be valid as against all persons." The statute provides that lien priority is
determined at the time of recordation and not at the time the future obligation is performed if the
creditor is "legally bound to make the advance or give the consideration resulting in such
obligation." Idaho Code § 45-108. The statute does not apply to determine priority of Liberty's
deed of trust for at least two reasons.
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First, a lien under the statute does not include a deed of trust: "[a] lien is a charge
imposed in some mode other than by a transfer in trust upon specific property by which it is
made security for the performance of an act." Idaho Code§ 45-101 (emphasis added); see also
Idaho Code§ 45-109 ("Notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, a lien, or a contract for a
lien, transfers no title to the property subject to the lien."). A deed of trust "convey[s] real
property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation." Idaho Code § 451502(3). Second, even if the statute could be extended to deeds of trust, it expressly applies to a
lien created "as security for the performance of obligations not then in existence." The Eighth
Agreement does not create any security for any future obligation or advance. Ex. JJ. As noted
above, it simply restructures Liberty's loan to The Point into two loans, maintaining the same
terms and same security. Id.
For those reasons, the district court's reliance on Idaho Code§ 45-108 as a basis to find
Liberty released Blocks A, D, E from its original deed of trust cannot be sustained.

B.

WKDT Cannot Enforce the Eighth Agreement as a Third-Party Beneficiary.
Despite allowing WKDT to enforce the Eighth Agreement against Liberty, the district

court refused to consider whether WKDT was a third-party beneficiary under the agreement,
finding the issue moot. R.Vol.6 at 1201. That was error. To find that the Eighth Agreement
released Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's original deed of trust, the district court must have
first considered whether WKDT was entitled to seek its enforcement. "Idaho case law is clear
that the party claiming to be a third-party beneficiary must show that the contract expressly
indicates that it was made for his or her direct benefit." De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc.,
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No. 39406, 2014 WL 1266104, at *4 (Idaho Mar. 28, 2014) (emphasis added), reh 'g denied
(Apr. 30, 2014); see also Idaho Code § 29-102 ("A contract, made expressly for the benefit of a
third person, may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it.").
Thus, before a third party can enforce a contract, "'it must be shown that the contract was
made for his direct benefit ... and that it is not sufficient that he be a mere incidental
beneficiary."' Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 579, 97 P.3d at446 (citation omitted; ellipsis in
original). A contract that would affect the priority of a lien if performed is no different. See

Coral Lakes Cmty. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Busey Bank, NA., 30 So. 3d 579, 584 (Fla. D.ist. Ct. App. 2010)
(finding bank in foreclosure action, as first mortgagee of property, was entitled to seek
enforcement of subordination provision in neighborhood's declaration of covenants and
restrictions as express third-party beneficiary and was not required to pay delinquent
homeowners' association assessments); Alden State Bank v. Sunrise Builders, Inc., 853 N.Y.S.2d
230, 232 (App. Div. 2008) (holding lender was entitled to enforce subordination clause in
homeowners' building contract with contractor based on lender's status as third-party beneficiary
of subordination clause).

Resolution Trust also illustrates the district court's legal error in allowing WKDT to
claim the benefit of the Eighth Agreement. There the Fifth Circuit also recognized that if the lot
owners were to preclude foreclosure, they had to show they were entitled to the benefit of the
original lender's subordination agreements and thus the lender's obligation to release its lien on
the lots once they were sold. 951 F.2d at 662. As under Idaho law, Texas law holds that only
actual parties to a contract or intended third-party beneficiaries can claim the benefit of a
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contract. Id. Because the original lender did not intend the subordination agreements to benefit
the lot owners, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that the lot owners had no
standing to enforce the release provisions of the agreements. Id. at 663.
WKDT is no different from the lot purchasers in Resolution Trust. WKDT is also a
complete stranger to the contract it seeks to enforce. 6 And just as the original lender's
subordination agreements contemplated the release of the subdivision lots in Resolution Trust,
the Eighth Agreement contemplated the release of Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's original
deed of trust. As a third party that is not mentioned in and does not directly benefit from the
Eighth Agreement, WKDT cannot claim the benefit of or enforce the agreement. The district
court's finding that Blocks A, D, and E were released from Liberty's original deed of trust can be
overruled on this basis too.

C.

Liberty's Foreclosure of Its Original Deed of Trust Was Not Wrongful.

1.

The November 14, 2012 Trustee's Sale Was Not Void as to WKDT.

Recognizing that WKDT loses under the arguments set forth above, apparently WKDT is
now going to argue that the foreclosure was wrongful. In its opposition to Liberty's motion to
stay the September 26, 2014 trustee's sale on Blocks A, D, and E, WKDT states, without
6

While the Eighth Agreement provides that "[t]his Agreement shall be binding upon, and
shall inure to the benefit of, the parties' respective heirs, successors and assigns," see Ex. JJ at 1
21, it does not refer to other lienholders, but only to successors and assigns to the agreement
itself, see Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 273, 688 P.2d 1172, 1178 (1984) (finding tenant was
not third-party beneficiary to prior lease that did not refer to future tenants under some future
lease but only to successors or assignees of the specific lease within which the language
appears). "The mere mention of a third party in a contract does not render that party a thirdparty beneficiary absent a showing that the contract was made for that party's direct benefit." De
Groot, 2014 WL 1266104, at *4 (citing Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 579, 97 P.3d at 446).
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authority, that "Liberty's foreclosure sale under the Seventh Loan Modification Agreement was
improper under Idaho law as the same constituted a foreclosure under a superseded Deed of
Trust." 7 See Respondent's Memo. in Opp. to Appellant's Motion to Stay September 26, 2014
Trustee's Sale at 19 (Sept. 11, 2014). If this is now WKDT's new position, WKDT loses on it as
well, because WKDT could only challenge the foreclosure if the foreclosure sale was void, not if
it was merely voidable.
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized this concept in the foreclosure context as to the
claims of competing creditors in New Phase Invs., LLC v. Jarvis, 153 Idaho 207,208, 280 P.3d
710, 711 (2012). In New Phase, the Court considered the issue of lien priority involving real
property as between two competing creditors, DAFCO, LLC ("DAFCO"), and New Phase
Investments, LLC ("New Phase"). DAFCO appealed a district court's determination on
summary judgment that DAFCO's first filed deed of trust was void under Idaho Code§ 32-912
because it encumbered community real property but was signed only by the husband instead of
by both spouses as required by the statute. The Court reversed and in doing so held that because
Idaho Code§ 32-912 was enacted for the protection of the community rather than third-party
creditors, and that because the wife did not challenge the foreclosure sale, New Phase could not
invoke that statute to void DAFCO's competing encumbrance. Id
Less than two months ago, the Idaho Supreme Court, in a case in which DAFCO sued the
title company and its agent on the title policies on the defect at issue in New Phase, highlighted
7

In fact none of the statements made by WKDT on page 19 of its response are supported
by cites to any authority whatsoever.
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the dichotomy between a deed of trust that is void as opposed to one that is merely voidable,
explaining its holding in New Phase as follows:
Ultimately, this Court held in the New Phase case that DAFCO's deed of trust
was only voidable, not void, and that New Phase, a third-party creditor, could not
invoke LC.§ 32-912 for its benefit. We explained that "DAFCO's deed of trust is
valid, not having been challenged by Rebecca. There is no dispute but that
DAFCO's trust deed was recorded prior to any of New Phase's. Being the firstrecorded encumbrance, DAFCO's trust deed has first priority."
DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 156 Idaho 749,752,331 P.3d 491,494 (2014) (citations
omitted). Indeed, it has long been the law in Idaho that a third-party creditor who is not a party
to the transaction cannot challenge a sale if the sale is not void, but merely voidable. See Hazard
v. Cole, l Idaho 276, 287 (1869) ("While a sale under a void judgment passes no title, if the

judgment is merely voidable for irregularity the sale is good.").
As a general matter, a foreclosure sale is void where there is no default or by reason of
the automatic stay provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Taylor v. Just,
138 Idaho 137, 141, 59 P.3d 308, 312 (2002) (finding foreclosure sale void because promissory
note was modified to cure default); Idaho Code§ 45-1510(2) (trustee's sale invalid by reason of
automatic stay). Other irregularities or defects in the sale, however, are merely voidable and thus
do not void the sale. See New Phase, 153 Idaho at 211,280 P.3d at 714. For instance, Idaho
Code § 45-1508 provides: "The failure to give notice to any of such persons by mailing,
personal service, posting or publication in accordance with section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall
not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so notified nor as to any such persons having
actual knowledge of the sale." The statute also provides that "any failure to comply with the
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provisions of section 45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of a sale in favor of a
purchaser in good faith for value at or after such sale." Idaho Code § 45-1508.
This framework, which distinguishes between foreclosure sales that are void and those
that are merely voidable, as well as an alternative category in which the defects are wholly
inconsequential, exists in many other jurisdictions as well. See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A.
Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 Duke L.J.
1399 (2004). This Duke Law Journal article, which offers an excellent articulation of the
differences between these defects, explains:
A unique terminology and system of classification have developed to
analyze defective power of sale foreclosures. Typically, courts recognize three
types of defects. Some defects are so substantial and prejudicial as to render the
foreclosure sale void. In this situation, no title, legal or equitable, passes to the
sale purchaser or the purchaser's subsequent grantees, except ultimately through
adverse possession .... Sales are typically void when, notwithstanding mortgagee
compliance with the prescribed statutory procedure, the mortgagee lacked a
substantive right to foreclose .....
Most defects, however, render a sale voidable rather than void. When this
is the case, bare legal title passes to the sale purchaser, subject to the right of those
injured by the defective foreclosure to have the sale set aside. Such defects,
which are normally irregularities in the execution of a foreclosure sale, must be
"substantial or result in a probable unfairness."
An inherent feature of a voidable sale (as opposed to one that is void) is
that all rights to set aside the sale will be cut off if the land passes into the hands
of a bona fide purchaser for value. When this occurs, the purchaser's title is
immune from attack ....
Finally, some defects are so inconsequential as to have no effect on the
validity of a foreclosure sale.

Id. at 1499-1502 (footnotes omitted).
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Nowhere in Section 45-1506 is there any requirement that the underlying modification
agreement, loan agreement, or promissory note be described in the notice. However, even
assuming for the sake of argument that Liberty should have cited the Eighth Agreement instead
of the Seventh Agreement, that would not render the sale void. See New Phase, 153 ldaho 207,
280 P.3d 710. While in some cases deficient notice can make a foreclosure sale void, this is not
one of them. First, although Section 45-1506 requires notice of the foreclosure sale to ajunior
lienholder, here it is undisputed that WKDT had notice of the trustee's sale. See Ex. 37.
Moreover, despite the trial court's erroneous ruling to the contrary, the evidence shows that
WKDT also had notice of the execution of the Eighth Agreement and a copy of the agreement
well before the trustee's sale, through the filings in In re The Point. Tr.Vol.I at 210:24-214:4;
Exs. YY, WW. But even assuming the trial court was correct, and WKDT did not know of the
Eighth Agreement until after the trustee's sale, under the statute relied upon by the trial court,
Idaho Code§ 45-108, WKDT could only have relied on the Eighth Agreement ifWKDT had
been aware of it.
Either way, as further discussed in Section N.B above, WKDT had no right to enforce
the Eighth Agreement and cause Blocks A, D, and E to be released, because WKDT was not an
intended third-party beneficiary of that agreement. Therefore, whether the Seventh or Eighth
Agreement was cited in the notice was wholly immaterial as to WKDT. Therefore, to the extent
it was even required, which it was not, the fact that the notice did not cite the Eighth Agreement
does not make the foreclosure void as to WKDT.
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2.

Any Rights That WKDT Had Were Extinguished by the Trustee's Sale.

Idaho Code§ 45-1508 provides that "[a] sale made by a trustee under this act shall
foreclose and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to
whom notice is given under section 45-1506, Idaho Code." WKDT unquestionably had notice of
the trustee's sale and The Point's default under Liberty's original deed of trust. See Ex. 37.
Indeed, in the October 17, 2012 letter, WKDT admitted it had notice of the foreclosure sale. Id.
As set forth above, the trustee's sale was not void, and proper notice was given under Idaho
Code§ 45-1506. As such, any rights WKDT had in the property were extinguished by the
November 14, 2012 foreclosure. See First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Eisenbarth, 123
Idaho 895,898, 853 P.2d 640,643 (Ct. App. 1993).

D.

Because Liberty Did Not Gain an Advantage by Taking a Clearly Inconsistent
Position, Judicial Estoppel Does Not Estop It from Arguing the Eighth Agreement Is
Not Enforceable.
On summary judgment, the district court held that Liberty was judicially estopped from

"denying the enforceability of the Eighth Modification Agreement." R.Vol.5 at 1048. As noted,
that ruling was critical to the district court's finding that the agreement released Blocks A, D, and

E from Liberty's original deed of trust, even though no release was recorded in Kootenai
County's official records. See R.Vol.6 at 1193-94 n.5. The district court has discretion to
invoke judicial estoppel. Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 492, 502 (2004). Here
the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the governing legal standards.
"[A] litigant who obtains a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through
means of sworn statements is judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary
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allegations or testimony, to obtain a recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the
same transaction or subject matter." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600
(2008). Judicial estoppel "'precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position,
and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position."' McKay v. Owens,
130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) (citation omitted). Liberty did not take
inconsistent positions on the "enforceability" of the Eighth Agreement to gain an advantage in
litigation.
The district court believed that Liberty had acknowledged the "enforceability" of the
Eighth Agreement in In re The Point-by attaching the agreement to its motion for relief-and
in Liberty v. Green-through Bradford Phillips' testimony that the agreement was "binding"but had denied the "enforceability" of the document in this action. 8 See R.Vol.5 at 1047-48. But
Liberty's position with respect to its interest in the Post Falls Landing property has never
wavered. Liberty consistently maintained that while the Eighth Agreement was a binding
agreement between Liberty and The Point, it did not operate to discharge Liberty's original deed
of trust. See, e.g., R.Vol.4 at 801-05 (arguing agreement did not impair original deed of trust and
was not performed); R.Vol.6 at 1168-76 (same).

8

As explained above (in§ I.C.5), Liberty's loan to The Point was not the subject of the
Florida consent order, and Florida regulators never required Liberty to recharacterize the loan in
any administrative or other action. However, to the extent the district court relied on the State of
Florida consent decree and Liberty's subsequent dealings with the state as a basis for finding
judicial estoppel, the doctrine does not apply to administrative proceedings. In re Pangburn, 154
Idaho 233,242,296 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2013).
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The semantics of that position was lost on the district court. The fact that the Eighth
Agreement is binding between Liberty and The Point does not mean the agreement is
"enforceable." Nelson v. Hazel, 89 Idaho 480,488,406 P.2d 138, 144 (1965) (finding it inherent
in law that person may not enforce collection under contract that has not been performed).
Further, Liberty has always claimed an interest in its original deed of trust on the Post Falls
Landing property due to the breach of The Point's original note. Ex. XX; R.Vol.5 at 954-55. Its
position here is no different. Liberty has merely asserted that the Eighth Agreement was not
performed and that, as such, the agreement is not enforceable. See Sword, 140 Idaho at 252, 92
P.3d at 502 (finding judicial estoppel did not apply to party taking position that agreement was
not enforceable in law or equity).
Equally important, even if Liberty made inconsistent statements regarding the
enforceability of the Eighth Agreement, the district court failed to find that Liberty obtained a
judgment, advantage, or consideration in either In re The Point or Liberty v. Green. See R.Vol.5
at 104 7-48. And indeed, it did not. There is no evidence in the record that the bankruptcy court
ever ruled on Liberty's motion to lift the automatic stay. See Indian Springs LLC v. Indian

Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,749,215 P.3d 457,469 (2009) (finding that party
asserting judicial estoppel failed to introduce any evidence that other party obtained advantage
from statement during bankruptcy proceeding).
In Liberty v. Green, the district court ruled against Liberty and granted The Point's
motion to enjoin the trustee's sale. R.Vol.3 at 649,659. Because Liberty never obtained a
judgment, advantage, or consideration in those matters, judicial estoppel does not apply here to
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prevent Liberty from challenging the legal effect of the Eighth Agreement. See Smith v. US.R. V.

Props., LC, 141 Idaho 795,800, 118 P.3d 127, 132 (2005)(finding doctrine did not apply to
prevent party from taking position in second litigation that was rejected in first litigation). In
sum, the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Liberty was judicially estopped from
denying the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement.

E.

The District Court Erred in Finding the Post Falls Landing Marina Is Personal
Property, Considering The Point's Subjective Intent, Rather Than Its Objective
Intent, in Developing the Marina.
The district court also erred when it relied on Harry Green's subjective intent to find the

Post Falls Landing Marina improvements were personal property, not a fixture, and that as a
result WKDT took priority to the marina property. See R.Vol.6 at 1198-99. The determination
of whether an item becomes a fixture usually presents a mixed question of law and fact, but
"where the facts are undisputed or when the evidence allows but one reasonable conclusion to be
drawn therefrom, the question may be decided as a matter of law." Everitt v. Higgins, 122 Idaho
708, 712, 838 P.2d 311,315 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). Here the facts surrounding the
Post Falls Landing Marina are not in dispute, and thus the question of whether the marina is a
fixture is a question of law, subject to free review. See Rowan v. Riley, 139 Idaho 49, 56, 72
P.3d 889, 896 (2003) (finding that irrigation well was fixture as matter of law).
The importance of separating personalty from fixtures stems from the principle that once
an item becomes a fixture, it is thereafter treated as a part of the realty until or unless it is severed
by the fee owner. See Everitt, 122 Idaho at 711, 838 P.2d at 314. The Idaho courts employ a
three-part test to determine whether an item has become a fixture. Rayl v. Shull Enters., Inc.,
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108 Idaho 524, 527, 700 P.2d 567, 570 (1984). The three tests are: "'(l) annexation to the
realty, either actual or constructive; (2) adaptation or application to the use or purpose to which
that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) intention to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold."' Id. (citation omitted).
Intention is the most important of the three elements. Id. at 528, 700 P.2d at 571. "The
intention sought is not the undisclosed purpose of the annexor, but rather the intention implied
and manifested by his act." Id. (citing Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385, 392,
201 P. 717,718 (1921)). The Court explained why in Beebe:

"It is an intention which settles, not merely [the annexor's] own rights, but the
rights of others who have or may acquire interests in the property. They cannot
know his secret purpose, and their rights depend not upon that, but upon the
inferences to be drawn from what is external and visible. In cases of this kind
every fact and circumstance should be considered which tends to show what
intention, in reference to the relation of the machine to the real estate, is properly
imputable to him who put it in position."
34 Idaho at 392, 201 P. at 718 ( citation omitted). There the Court considered whether the door to
a bank vault was a fixture or personal property as between an attaching creditor and a mortgagee.
See id. The Court ruled that "[n]either party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of
the owner." Id. at 392,201 P. at 719.
It follows that "intent should be determined from the surrounding circumstances at the
time of installation, and not necessarily from testimony as to the subjective intent of the installer
and his frame of mind at the time of installation." Rayl, 108 Idaho at 528, 700 P.2d at 571. The
relevant inquiry is whether the objective circumstances manifest an intent to annex the object to
the land at the time of installation. Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 268,
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297 P.3d 222, 231 (2012); see also Beebe, 34 Idaho at 392, 201 P. at 719 (stating intention
should be inferred from nature of object affixed, relation and situation of annexor, structure and
mode of annexation, and purpose for which annexation has been made).
The remaining two factors-annexation and adaptation-are intended to assist the trier of
fact in determining the party's objective intent. Rayl, 108 Idaho at 528,700 P.2d at 571; Steel
Farms, 154 Idaho at 268-69, 297 P.3d at 231-32 (stating Rayl reiterated requirement that courts
assess objective intent, annexation, and adaptation to determine intent). Annexation is
considered in light of the actual relationship of the object to the realty. Rayl, 108 Idaho at 527,
700 P.2d at 570. A fixture may be actually, as well as constructively, annexed to the real
property. Id The Court explained this principle in Rayl: '"constructive annexation may be
found where the objects, although not themselves attached to the realty, comprise a necessary,
integral or working part of some other object which is attached."' Id at 528, 700 P.2d at 571
(citation omitted). The adaptation test is held to be met when the object is clearly adapted to the
use to which the realty is devoted. Id.
Considering the three-part test, the district court found that the Post Falls Landing Marina
satisfied the annexation and adaptation factors. R.Vol.6at1197-98. As for annexation, the
district court found the marina facilities were connected to the upland property through a ramp
and fuel, water, and electrical lines. Id. With respect to adaptation, the district court found the
marina and its improvements "are useful to the adjunct real property, as a marina was completed
as a part of the overall development." Id. at 1198. But considering intent, the district court
relied on Harry Green's "subjective intent that the Marina and its improvements were not
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permanent." Id. According to the district court, Green testified that "he did not necessarily
intend for the Marina to be a permanent amenity of the Post Falls Landing Project" and the
marina was designed to be located anywhere, to pull apart, and to be relocated. Id.
The district court erred in finding the marina facilities were personal property. First, the
district court misapplied the legal standard governing the intention factor. The district court
considered and gave improper weight to Green's subjective intent. In doing so, the district court
violated Rayl's command that intention does not focus on the "undisclosed purpose of the actor,
but rather the intention implied and manifested by his act." Rayl, 108 Idaho at 528, 700 P.2d at
571. To be sure, the Idaho Court of Appeals has found that objective intent may be inferred from
"(l) the nature of the article; (2) the manner of annexation to the land; (3) the
injury to the land, if any, by its removal; ( 4) the completeness with which the
chattel is integrated with the use to which the land is being put; (5) the relation
which the annexer has with the land such as licensee, tenant at will or for years or
for life or fee owner; (6) the relation which the annexer has with the chattel such
as owner, bailee or converter; (7) the local custom respecting treating such chattel
as personal property or a fixture; (8) the time, place and degree of social,
economic and cultural development, (e.g., a luxury in one generation is a
necessity in another ... ); and (9) all other relevant facts surrounding the
annexation."

Everitt, 122 Idaho at 712, 83 8 P .2d at 315 (citation omitted; ellipsis in original). The district
court considered none of those factors in considering intention, instead relying on Green's
subjective intent that the marina not be permanent and be designed to be relocated.
For instance, despite finding the marina is useful to Post Falls Landing for the purposes
of adaptation, the district court did not consider that the marina was planned as part of Post Falls
Landing from the start, was not developed as a stand-alone enterprise, was constructed in

- 41 76940671.10 0054341-00001

conjunction with the two boardwalk condominium buildings, was planned to be used into the
indefinite future, was operated as part of the development, and remains in place. The district
court also failed to consider that Kootenai County-as well as assessors around the State of
Idaho-assesses commercial marinas as real property. See Prudente v. Nechanicky, 84 Idaho 42,
47, 367 P.2d 568,570 (1961) (finding houseboat is personal property, in part because it is
assessed and taxed as personal property). Because Green's subjective intent cannot bind Liberty
and WKDT, see Beebe, 34 Idaho at 392,201 P. at 718, the district court misapplied the intention
factor to Liberty's prejudice.
Second (and alternatively), at the very least, the district court should have separately
assessed the component parts of the marina. See Steel Farms, 154 Idaho at 268, 297 P.3d at 231
( recognizing that Court has affirmed separate assessment of component parts of irrigation
systems to determine whether each part is fixture or personal property). In Rowan, for example,
the Court separately considered the character of a well, well casings, mainline, and pump
comprising an irrigation system and found some of the components to be fixtures and others to
be personal property. 139 Idaho at 53, 72 P.3d at 893.
The Post Falls Landing Marina also includes components of different character. The
j

floating docks are, by their nature, moveable. On the other hand, the marina's fixed pier dock,
boat landing platform, and underground fuel tanks were all affixed and secured to the upland
property, requiring greater removal efforts. The district court failed to give any consideration to
those components of the marina, instead focusing only on the floating docks. See R.Vol.6 at
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1198-99. The district court's ruling that the Post Falls Landing Marina constitutes personal
property should also be overturned for this reason.
V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Liberty respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
district court's judgment, denial of Liberty's motion for reconsideration, and finding that WKDT
is entitled to priority to Blocks A, D, and E of the Post Falls Landing property. In addition,
Liberty asks the Court to reverse the district court's judgment, denial of Liberty's motion for
reconsideration, and finding that the Post Falls Landing Marina improvements are personal
property and not a fixture.
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